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THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AND
THE MONROE DOCTRINE-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
Ann Van Wynen Thomas*
A. J. Thomas, Jr.**
BACKGROUND
A discussion of the Monroe Doctrine today is approached with
some trepidation by the wary, for the revered dogma ("I believe
in the Monroe Doctrine, in our Constitution and in the laws of
God") 1 often described as "the first and most fundamental" of
the foreign policies of the United States and a protector of the
Western Hemisphere from extracontinental aggression has,2 in
recent years, been subjected to bitter attack. It has been called
moribund, obsolete, verbiage,3 a name so hateful to Latin Ameri-
can ears that the United States fears to mention it much less in-
voke it because of its abrasive effect on continental relations.4
Possibly the most devastating assault emanated from Mr. Khru-
shchev of the Soviet Union when he proclaimed:
"We consider that the Monroe Doctrine has outlived its
time . . . has died, so to say, a natural death. Now the re-
mains of this doctrine should best be buried as every dead
body is so that it should not poison the air by its decay."5
To this statement the Department of State of the United
States retorted that the "principles of the Monroe Doctrine are
as valid today as they were in 1823 when the Doctrine was pro-
claimed."6 President Eisenhower declared that the doctrine "has
by no means been supplanted."'7
Attitudes of disrespect and denunciation of this serviceable
old gray mare, at least from friends of America, seem ungrateful
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Southern Methodist University.
** Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1. These are words uttered by Mary Baker Eddy as quoted in D. PER-
KINS, A HISTORY OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE iX (rev. ed. 1955); and J. MECHAM,
A SURVEY OF UNITED STATES LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS 54 n.1 (1965).
2. Dulles, International Communism in Guatemala, 31 DEP'T STATE BULL.
43 (1954).
3. J. MECHAM, A SURVEY OF UNITED STATES LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS 82
(1965).
4. F. DONOVAN, MR. MONROE'S MESSAGE 223 (1963); R. BURR, OUR TROUBLED
HEMISPHERE 61 (1967).
5. N.Y. Times, July 13, 1960.
6. Dep't State, U.S. Reaffirms Principles of Monroe Doctrine, Press
Release 392, July 14, 1960, 43 DEP'T STATE BULL. 170 (1960).
7. PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, DWIGHT D.
EISENHOWER 1960-61, at 651 (1961).
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when history's judgment is reviewed. It has to a degree deterred
extracontinental interventions in the Western Hemisphere, as-
suring the nations of America of self-determination by protect-
ing them from progressions of European imperialisms with some
exceptions such as certain European territorial expansion in the
earlier days of the doctrine's existence when the United States
lacked power to enforce it, or the temporary European recon-
quest in Mexico and in the Dominican Republic during the War
between the States when the United States was too preoccu-
pied internally to enforce the doctrine.
The jaundiced view of Latin America arises from the fact
that the United States did not regard the doctrine as applicable
to its own activities during the later days of the nineteenth
century and the first decades of this century when the United
States embarked on a hemispheric interventionary policy which
was called dollar diplomacy, imperialism, and hegemony. But
these United States interventions were not carried out in classic
imperialistic fashion for, with the exception of leased areas in
Panama and Cuba, the United States acquired no territory and
disclaimed intention of taking permanent possession of the states
intervened; a disclaimer borne out by later events.8
The Monroe Doctrine, as proclaimed by President Monroe to
the Congress of the United States in 1823, set forth three prin-
ciples.9 Concerning the first, which is called the non-colonization
principle, the message stated: "The American continents, by the
free and independent condition which they have assumed and
maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for
future colonization by any European power." The announce-
ment of this principle had as its purpose the forestalling of
threatened Russion territorial advances in the northwestern por-
tion of the American continent. The second principle announced
by President Monroe was that of non-intervention. It was divid-
ed into two parts, a statement of a policy of non-intervention by
the United States into European affairs, and a warning against
8. On the background and history of the Monroe Doctrine see D. PER-
KINS, HANDS OFF: A HISTORY OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE (1941); D. PERKINS,
A HISTORY OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE (rev. ed. 1955); F. DONOVAN, MR. MONROE'S
MESSAGE (1963); A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION: THE LAW AND
ITS IMPORT IN THE AMERICAS 10-64 (1956); THE MONROE DOCTRINE, ITS MODERN
SIGNIFICANCE (D. Dozer, ed., 1965); Higgins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1924 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 102.
9. The Doctrine is contained in 6 MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
401 (1906).
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European intervention in the Americas. As to the first the mes-
sage stated:
"In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to
themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it com-
port with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are
invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or
make preparation for our defense."
It is rather apparent that the self-limiting injunction of non-
involvement in European affairs is no longer part of United States
policy. The contention that the remaining principles of the Mon-
roe Doctrine are therefore no longer valid, however, would ap-
pear to have little merit, for the Monroe Doctrine was never a
signed and sealed contract with Europe based on certain condi-
tions. It was a unilateral pronouncement of the United States for
the security of the United States and the Western Hemisphere,
which later became a multilateral hemispheric principle. That
involvement in European affairs did not terminate other portions
of the doctrine is amply demonstrated in modern times, for the
United States following World War I (in which it was some-
what involved in European affairs) continued to insist upon the
doctrine with such vehemence that it was specifically recognized
in the Covenant of the League of Nations.
The Monroe Doctrine in inhibiting European intervention in
the Americas went on to declare:
"With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity
more immediately connected, and by causes which must be
obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The
political system of the allied powers is essentially different
in this respect from that of America .... We owe it, there-
fore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing be-
tween the United States and those powers to declare that we
should consider any attempt on their part to extend their
system to any parts of this hemisphere as dangerous to our
peace and safety ... [W]e could not view any interposition
for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any
other manner their destiny, by any European power in any
other light as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition
toward the United States .... It is impossible that the allied
Powers should extend their political system to any portion
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of either continent without endangering our peace and hap-
piness; nor can one believe that our southern brethren, if
left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It
is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such
interposition in any form with indifference."
It should be recalled that the Monroe Doctrine was pro-
claimed in an attempt to block the plans of the Holy Alliance.
This alliance, formed by the emperors of Russia and Austria,
and the king of Prussia and certain other European monarchs,
feared as terrible plague, the spreading of the republican form
of government. The members of the Holy Alliance insisted that
uniformity of internal governmental order was necessary for
the peace of Europe and consequently sought to impose both in
Europe and in the Americas their absolutist form of legitimate
divine right governments, which can be considered as the totali-
tarianism of that day.10
The Monroe Doctrine, as a unilateral policy of the United
States came to be or not to be enforced on such terms as the
United States saw fit. Eventually in the 1930s a pledge of non-
intervention was extracted by Latin America from the United
States, and a hesitant multilateralization by continentalization
of the doctrine occurred." This process reached its culmination
by the terms of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assis-
tance (The Rio Treaty).12 By the provisions of this instrument
the American community became collectively responsible for the
maintenance of the peace and security of the Americas not only
against external aggressions and dangers, but also against intra-
continental breaches of and threats to the peace. With the reor-
ganization of the inter-American system in 1948 and its meta-
morphosis into the Organization of American States, the con-
10. See D. PERKINS, THE MONROE DOCTRINE 1823-1826 (1932). For brief
summary see A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION, THE LAW AND ITS
IMPORT IN THE AMERICAS 8-14 (1956). The Monroe Doctrine would seem to
condemn political as well as military aggression coming from outside the
continent, for it recognized a basic difference between European authoritari-
anism and American democracy and incorporated the idea that attempt to
extend such authoritarianism to this hemisphere would endanger the secur-
ity of the United States. For accord with this point of view see J. DEIER,
THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AND THE HEMISPHERE CRISIS 14 (1962).
11. On this development see A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, THE ORGANIZATION
OF AMERICAN STATES 19-32, 205-11 (1963); D. Jobim, "An International Agree-
ment," as set forth in THE MONROE DOCTRINE, ITS MODERN SIGNIFICANCE (D.
Dozer, ed., 1965).
12. PAU, Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Treaty Series
8, OEA/Ser.A/1 (1961).
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tinentalized Monroe Doctrine was incorporated in Article 25 of
the Charter of the Organization of American States, the Charter
of Bogotd.18
COLLECTIVE ACTION
Although the Americas were concerned with the subversive
intervention of nazism-fascism during World War II and took
measures to combat it, international communism had been
thought to be of limited importance in the Western Hemisphere. 14
This outlook tended to prevail until 1954 when the Guatemalan
Government became communist infected. 15 The Americas were
confronted once again with a violation of the Monroe Doctrine
in the form of a non-American subversive intervention in the
hemisphere with an object of imposing a totalitarian system
from abroad. To such an intrusion and imposition, Monroe's
doctrine would appear to be applicable and opposed.1 6 The Holy
Alliance gained its objective by armed intervention to put down
revolution against autocratic hereditary monarchy. This twen-
tieth century form of totalitarianism has relied mainly on sub-
version to impose its political system and control.
Earlier in 1948 at the Ninth International Conference of
American States and again in 1951 at the Fourth Meeting of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the aggressive totalitarian character
of communism was declared incompatible with American princi-
ples, and the intervention of communism in the life of the Amer-
ican nations was condemned. Recommendations were made to the
republics to take measures to meet its threat. 7 With the de-
teriorating situation in Guatemala additional measures were
13. PAU, Charter of the Organization of American States as Amended
by the Protocol of Buenos Aires in 1967, Treaty Series 1-C OEA/Ser.A/2 Rev.
(1968).
14. See F. V. GARCIA AMADOR, THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM ITS DEVELOP-
MENT AND STRENGTHENING 113 (1966); A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, THE ORGANIZA-
TION OF AMERICAN STATES 354 (1963).
15. For some of the literature on the Guatemalan case see A. THOMAS &
A. THOMAS, THE ORGANIZATION oF AMERICAN STATES 302 (1963); D. JAMES, RED
DESIGN FOR THE AMERICAS: GUATEMALAN PRELUDE (1954); Intervention of Inter-
national Communism in Guatemala, DEP'T STATE PUB. 5556, Inter-Am. Series
48 (1954). The view of the Guatemalan government of President Arbenz Is
presented by G. TORIELLO, LA BATALLA DE GUATEMALA (1955).
16. John Foster Dulles spoke of the Intrusion of Soviet despotism Into
the hemisphere as a direct challenge to the Monroe Doctrine. See Dulles,
31 DEP'T STATE BULL. 43 (1954).
17. Resolution XXXII incorporated in Ninth International Conference of
American States, Bogota, Colombia, Report of the Delegation of the U.S.A.
266, at 69, DEP'T STATE PuB. 3263 (Int. Org. & Conf. Series 2, Am. REP. 3, 1948).
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thought to be needed. The Tenth Inter-American Conference
meeting in 1954 in Caracas adopted the Declaration of Solidarity
for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American
States against the Intervention of International Communism",
in an attempt to cope with the situation at hand. Again recom-
mendation was made that the American governments take steps
for the purpose of counteracting communism's subversive activi-
ties, but it was further provided:
"That the domination or control of the political institutions
of any American state by the international communist move-
ment extending to this hemisphere, the political system of an
extra-continental power would constitute a threat to the
sovereignty and political independence of the American
states, endangering the peace of America, and would call
for a Meeting of Consultation to consider the adoption of
appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties."'19
The legality of this declaration was questioned. It was said
to be an amendment to the Charter of Bogotd which prohibits
intervention of either an individual or collective nature.20 A
mere conference resolution cannot amend a treaty.21 If the reso-
lution attempted to amend the Charter, sanctions against com-
munist domination would be void. This reasoning would be cor-
rect only if the declaration were an amendment. But it can be
rationally argued that the declaration was interpretive not
amendatory. It interpreted, in advance, the broad phrase of
Article 25 of the Charter of Bogota and Article 6 of the Rio
Treaty, "fact or situation" which affects the territorial integrity,
sovereignty or political independence of any American state and
endangers the peace of America as including the domination or
control of the political institutions of an American state by the
international communist movement. When this fact or situation
endangering the peace occurs and when the consultative organ
so determines, the organ is directed to order the necessary
measures to remove this threat to hemispheric peace. The col-
18. Resolution XCIII, Tenth Inter-American Conference, Caracas, Vene-
zuela, Report of the Delegation of the U.S.A. 156-57, DEP'T STATE PUB. 5692
(Int. Org. & Conf. Series 11, Am. REP. 14, 1955).
19. Id.
20. J. MECHAM, A SURVEY OF UNITED STATES LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS 217
(1965).
21. On the effect of conference resolutions see A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS,
THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 67 (1963).
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lective measures authorized by the terms of the Rio Treaty con-
stitute conventional exceptions to the non-intervention principle.
Secretary of State Dulles affirmed that this declaration
amounted to a confirmation of the Monroe Doctrine in its con-
tinentalized status. He was of the opinion that the threat of in-
ternational communism constituted a danger similar to that
against which the Monroe Doctrine had been directed when
first expressed, and that, since the doctrine was no longer a
unilateral but a multilateral declaration, it became appropriate
for all of the American states to recognize the common danger
presented by the seizure of control of the political institutions
of any one of them by international communism.22
In its classical sense the Monroe Doctrine signified that the
United States would act against European interventions in order
to prevent aggressions as well as acquisitions of additional ter-
ritory by such states in the Western Hemisphere. The doctrine
was later extended to interventionary action by any non-
American nation.23 The Rio Treaty created a system of collective
security for the common defense of the hemisphere in the face
of non-American armed or unarmed aggression, or in the face
of any other conflict, fact, or situation that might endanger the
peace of America; provided that the sovereignty, political inde-
pendence, or territorial sovereignty of an American state is at
the same time affected.2 4 Thus the Organization of American
States is authorized to take certain collective measures against
a non-American state which extends or attempts to extend its
system for control or domination of an American state by aggres-
sion against that state or by otherwise endangering hemispheric
peace. These measures are taken to assist the victim state in case
of aggression, or in any event, to provide for the defense and
the maintenance of the peace and security of the hemisphere.
The Rio Treaty is not confined to extra-continental aggres-
sion, but extends to intra-American peace and provides collec-
tive security against an American state guilty of aggressions
against a fellow American state or of other acts which endanger
American peace. Thus the Caracas Declaration interprets the
22. Note 16 supra.
23. As applied to Japan on the occasion of the Magdalena Bay Incident,
see Bailey, The Lodge Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, 48 POL. Sci. Q. 235(1933); D. PERKINS, A HISTORY OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE 272 (Rev. ed. 1955).
24. On the Interpretation of the terms of the Rio Treaty, see A. THOMAS
& A. THOMAS, THE ORGANIZATION OF THE AMERICAN STATES 249 (1963).
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Rio Treaty and permits an authorization of collective action by
the Organization of American States against a state of the
Americas subjected to the control or domination of the interna-
tional communist movement on the ground that this would con-
stitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence
of the American states endangering the peace of the Americas.
Account should be taken of the fact that although an extension
of an extra-continental system to the hemisphere is involved
here so as to remind one of the Monroe Doctrine, still the cor-
rective action is not necessarily to be directed against the non-
American state to force it to desist in its interference or domi-
nation. Rather the corrective action is taken against the Ameri-
can state which is controlled or dominated by the non-
hemispheric regime. This was a new corollary to the Monroe Doc-
trine-a collective American counter-intervention to remove a
non-American political system imposed by a non-American in-
tervention from its domination of an American state in the
interests of continental defense, peace, and security. This recalls
a former corollary-the Theodore Roosevelt corollary to the
Monroe Doctrine-under which the United States would inter-
vene in the affairs of an American state to prevent, in the in-
terests of continental peace and security, a non-American in-
tervention.2
Corollaries to the Monroe Doctrine which permit it to be
turned inward against an American state cause Latin America
to become restive. Images are brought to mind of former United
States interventions in the area which were often bitterly re-
sented. Mexico, for example, at the Caracas Conference con-
demned the subversive intervention of extra-continental com-
munist power in the Americas, but still believed that the Caracas
Declaration would permit collective intervention in the domestic
internal affairs of an American state to remove a government
under the pretense that it was communist dominated and a
threat to the peace. Neither her fears nor those of Argentina
were allayed by an addendum to the declaration which empha-
sized that its ,terms were not applicable to an assumption of
power in an American state by a local political party dedicated
to a national type of communism.2 Pure national brands of com-
25. For a discussion of the corollary and reasons therefor see I. HYDE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES
§ 92 (2d ed. 1947) (hereinafter cited as HYDE).
26. Argentina and Mexico abstained from the vote on the Caracas decia-
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munism are uncommon and those which may exist, with the
exception of Yugoslavia and possibly Rumania, seem to be bent
on exporting their own versions of communism through sub-
versive intervention to control and dominate other states.
The declaration if properly applied would protect the in-
ternal and external self-determination of the American people
from the imposition of a foreign totalitarian political system and
control. The Organization of American States would be author-
ized to remove the system from the state which had been so
subjected in the interests of the maintenance of continental
peace and security. By so doing the continued self-determination
or sovereignty of other American states would be assured. At
the same time self-determination would be restored to the state
and its people where it had been lost through the subversive
intervention and by betrayal by certain leaders of the state, for,
in the words of the Monroe Doctrine, "it is inconceivable that
our southern brethren would adopt such a foreign system of
their own accord."
Even though the Declaration of Caracas would permit collec-
tive measures against an extra-continental political domination,
in actuality it has not been made a basis of OAS action in any
of the subsequent cases arising before the organ of consulta-
tion. In the case of the communist infiltration in Guatemala in
relation to which the declaration was drafted, the communist
issue was resolved without effective OAS action, for that situa-
tion was taken care of by the overthrow of the communist pene-
trated government by a group of Guatemalan rebels (aided by
the United States) proceeding from neighboring Central Ameri-
can nations. At one point the Council of the OAS did call a
Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers to consider dan-
gers to continental peace and security "resulting from the pene-
tration of the political institutions of Guatemala by the inter-
national communist movement" and the necessary measures to
be taken. The declaration was not mentioned in the resolution
convoking the Meeting, which was never held because of the
ration. Guatemala voted against it. For the Mexican viewpoint see PAU,
Decima Conferencia Interamericana, Actas y Documentos, volumen II, pp.
135-38, 314-17 (1958). See also on the declaration, Fenwick, Tenth Inter-
American Conference: Some Issues of Inter-American Regional Law, 48 AM.
J. INT'L L. 464 (1954); Fenwick, Intervention at the Caracas Conference, 48
AM. J. INT'L L. 451 (1954).
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rebel takeover of the Guatemalan Government. 7 Indeed the
declaration would appear to have a tendency to obstruct collec-
tive action in that it introduces necessity of some proof of the
domination or control of the country by the international com-
munist movement, a difficult question at best to resolve and
not required for the taking of measures by the OAS under the
Rio Treaty. Indeed, measures can under certain circumstances
be taken under that treaty before control or domination of the
political system of the country has come about in order to pre-
vent the control or domination. For example, article 3 of the
Rio Treaty demands individual and collective measures to be
taken by the American states against any state guilty of an
armed attack against an American state. Such measures are
authorized by article 51 of the United Nations Charter in the
individual or collective right of self-defense. Article 6 of the
Rio Treaty requires and permits the American States to take
collective measures in cases of aggressions which are not armed
attacks as well as in any other situations which might endanger
the peace of America and which affect the territorial integrity,
the sovereignty or political independence of an American state.
The collective measures specified in article 8 for action under
either article 3 or 6 are the same: rupture of diplomatic and/or
consular relations, partial or complete interruptions of economic
relations or of communications, and use of armed force. The
issue naturally arises as to the legality of measures which may
be taken by a regional organization like the Organization of
American States which, in its action, must conform to the
United Nations Charter. Under that Charter the right of col-
lective security measures without United Nations' authorization
would seem to exist only in the exercise of the right of indi-
vidual or collective self-defense. Article 51 of that document
proclaims:
"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until
the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security."28
But for this single exception, it might be thought that the
27. PAU, Applications of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assis-
tance 1948-1956, at 151.
28. The United Nations Charter is contained in BASIC DOCUMENTS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 1 (Sohn, 2d ed. 1968).
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Organization of American States could not resort to measures
in other cases because article 53 of the United Nations Charter
declares that "no enforcement action shall be taken under re-
gional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authori-
zation of the Security Council." And the Charter obligates the
members to refrain from the threat or use of force without
United Nations sanction with the exception of an exercise of
individual or collective self-defense.29 Nevertheless the Organi-
zation of American States has always taken the position that it
is legally empowered to take measures not involving physical
violence (force) without United Nations' authority and without
violating article 53 because such lesser measures are not re-
garded as "enforcement action or measures." Measures of physi-
cal violence are thought to be the only measures of enforcement.
Measures not involving force are not so considered, for it is con-
tended that it is within the power of a state without violating
the purposes of the United Nations Charter to break diplomatic,
consular, and economic relations or to interrupt its communica-
tions with another state.80
Collective measures not involving the use of force may not
be sufficient to prevent an intervention direct or subversive by
international communism in the Americas or to remove a regime
dominated or controlled by this villain. Thus, if requisite could
the OAS agree upon the use of the ultimate collective measure,
the use of armed force? Insofar as the Rio Treaty is concerned
no distinction is made as to the nature of measures to be taken
other than that the Organ of Consultation can bind no state to
the use of armed force without its consent, although lesser
measures may be made obligatory. But the action taken must
not be inconsistent with the United Nations Charter, and accord-
ing to a restrictive and literal view of article 51, this article
29. Art. 2(4) of the Charter commands:
"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
purpose of the United Nations."
30. PAU, Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental
Peace and Security, Rio de Janeiro, Report on Results of Conference, Sub-
mitted to the Governing Board of the Pan American Union by the Director
General 41-42 (1947). For discussion see A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, THE
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 270 (1963). An excellent discussion of the
various OAS cases in relation to the U.N. is that of MacDonald, The Devel-
oping Relationship between Superior and Subordinate Political Bodies at the
International Level; A Note on the Experience of the United Nations and
the Organoization of American States, 2 CANADIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 21 (1964).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
limits the right of individual or collective self-defense, and con-
sequently the right to use armed force, to an instance when an
armed attack has actually occurred.81 If this view is correct,
armed force may only be used against an actual and direct armed
attack launched by regular military units of a communist state
against the Americas or an indirect armed attack whereby the
communist state operates through irregular groups or terrorists
who may be citizens but political dissidents of the victim state
and who use armed force in rebellious activities against that
state. Such an attack would be attributable to the state foment-
ing it and would give rise to the protective right of self-defense.
But what if the communist state's action or aggression does
not take the form of armed attack, but consists of an imminent
threat of armed force, or of delictual and interventionary con-
duct of a more subtle type to bring about a government's over-
throw through ideological aggression, including hostile propa-
ganda, which can be just as dangerous and menacing to a state's
security and its political independence as an illegal use of force?
If the very restrictive position is taken that the right of indi-
vidual and collective self-defense extends only to an illegal
armed attack, then of course the OAS would be precluded from
a use of armed force in these types of aggression.
But there is a broader view of self-defense, which contends
that the United Nations Charter does not change the right of
self-defense as it existed at international law, and that at inter-
national law the right of self-defense is not restricted to repel-
ling an illegal use of force only, but extends to other delinquencies
where it is exercised in a preventive, protective, and non-
retributive manner. It is claimed that a state may legitimately
resort to the right of self-defense for its protection when its
essential rights are endangered by delictual conduct of another
state. The danger to these rights must be unlawful, it must be
serious, and it must be actual or so imminent that the necessity
to resort to self-defense is instant and overwhelming. In addition
the right is conditioned upon the absence of other lawful means
of protection, and the measures used must be reasonable, limited
to averting an illegal danger and proportionate to that danger.3 2
31. See, e.g., H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 791 (1950);
W. BECKETT, THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 13 (1950); Kunz, Individual and
Collective Self-Defenae in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,
41 AM. J. INT'L L. 872, 878 (1947).
82. See, e.g., D. BOWETT, S, LF-DEFENSu IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. I (1958)
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It is further reasoned that article 51 is only a declaratory article
designed to preserve the right of self-defense, not to limit it,
and containing no additional obligations. It is then maintained
that article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter (which prohibits
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of a state in a manner inconsistent with
the purposes of the United Nations Charter) is not inconsistent
with the traditional right of self-defense, for interim measures
taken by a state to protect its vital legal rights-even when in-
volving a threat or use of force-are not taken against the ter-
ritorial integrity or political independence of the state com-
mitting the delict or are not inconsistent with the purposes of
the United Nations.88
From a more practical point of view it can be pointed out
that the political necessities of modern international life force a
recognition by general international law, as well as the inter-
national law of the United Nations Charter, of a broad right of
self-defense, for to limit such right to instances of armed attack
in the absence of a truly effective collective security system
could well circumscribe the legal rights of a state or group of
states. A state can hardly be expected to wait for the actual
attack in the face of imminent threat thereof, for, if it did so in
this nuclear age, the state might be so paralyzed by the attack
that it could no longer render resistance. Nor can it be expected
to sit idly by in the face of other types of aggression and illegal
acts which jeopardize its security.84 Following this view, and
(hereinafter cited as BoWETT); B. CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 94 (1953);
HYDE § 70; I. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 172 (4th ed.
1960). The violation of the essential rights of a state which would justify
self-defense are, according to Bowett, the following: the right of territorial
integrity, the right of political independence, the right of protection over
nationals, and certain economic rights. BowErTT Part I and as summed up
at 270.
33. BOWETT 188. See aZso J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER, ch. 5
(1958).
34. A primary question would be whether or not the use of armed force
against such subversion would be proportionate. Thus can it be reasoned
that In today's world the use of force against a subversive intervention (not
involving the use of armed force) of the communist movement is propor-
tional? Pompe would say:
"Through indirect action, via secret agents or Internal groups supported
by outside propaganda (the 'ideological' aggression), money, arms, and at
the critical moment of the disturbances, by direct intimidation and
political pressure, a state can put an end to the independent existence
of another as effectively as with the classical, external military aggres-
sion."
N. PoMPE, AGGRESSIVE WAB 53 (1953).
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since self-defense, collective or individual, may involve the use
of armed force if proportionate to the danger, collective action
may be taken by the American states to protect their security
against the violations of their rights by the direct or indirect
aggressions of communist imperialism. Such violation, as it en-
dangers the political independence of American states through
the extensions to this hemisphere of the aggressive and totali-
tarian policies of a non-American ideology, brings into play the
multilateralized Monroe Doctrine of self-defense directed against
an immediate danger of illegal non-American intervention, a
danger to the real and legitimate interests of all of the American
states bound together by a proximate relationship.
Following the Guatemalan affair the inter-American scene
was quiescent for some five years; the intervention of the inter-
national communist movement not being ostensibly overt. Dra-
matic change came with the rise to power in 1959 of Fidel Castro
in Cuba. Within a short period an increasing orientation of
Castro's revolution toward the Moscow-Peiping axis became
marked, and attempts to export Castroism and the Cuban revo-
lution to other American nations occurred. These activities were
alarming not only because they breached American international
agreements forbidding intervention, but also because they were
abetted and encouraged by foreign non-hemispheric powers. In
the face of what would appear to be a flagrant violation of the
Monroe Doctrine and the Caracas Declaration as well and viola-
tions of the American principle of non-intervention by the sub-
versive and aggressive activities by Cuba against certain of its
neighbors and despite the legal right of the OAS to take certain
measures against the intervention of the international commu-
nist movement in the Americas, little was done. When in 1959
the governments of Panama and Nicaragua complained of in-
vasions by exiles and others attempting to overthrow their gov-
ernments, invasions in which Cuba was implicated, the Council
of the OAS, acting as provisional organ under the Rio Treaty,
sent out investigating committees and attempted to settle the
problems. In a similar instance involving the Dominican Re-
public the pressures were such that the Council could not act
because the Venezuelan and Cuban governments were opposed
to the application of the Rio Treaty in that instance and other
Latin American governments were hesitant to come to the aid
[VOL.. 30
1970] ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 555
of the dictatorial regime of the Dominican Republic existing at
that time.85
By August 1960 after Castro's nationalization of property of
United States citizens in Cuba, after the United States had cut
the Cuban sugar quota, after the Soviet Union's threatened
attack on the United States if Cuba were faced with armed
United States action, and after a declaration from President
Eisenhower that the United States would not stand idly by and
permit the establishment in the Western Hemisphere of a regime
dedicated to international communism," the OAS at the Seventh
Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs denounced communist
intervention in the Americas without specifically naming Cuba
and condemned the attempts of Russia and Communist China
to make use of the political or social situation of any American
state for their own purposes.3 7 It should be noted thai no recom-,
mendations for collective action against the non-American in-
truders were forthcoming, nor was there action directed inward
against the American state which had come to be dominated by
the international communist movement.
This condemnation failed to better the Cuban situation or
prevent the continuation of the non-American and Cuban in,
terventionary activities in the Americas. In December 1961
Castro removed all doubt concerning his political commitment
by proclaiming openly that he was and had always been a dedi-
cated Marxist-Leninist. He announced that he was determined
to make Cuba a communist state in every sense of the word.
With such evidence and with the ever-increasing efforts by the
Castro regime to export the communist creed by revolution or
subversion to other parts of the hemisphere, the United States
and some Latin American nations, particularly the small Central
American states and certain states of northern South America
who had come to realize the Castroist activities as a danger to
their security, favored calling a Meeting of American Foreign
Ministers to bring about the imposition of diplomatic and eco-
nomic measures against Cuba. Finally, after heated debate, the
Council of the OAS voted with five abstentions and two nays to
35. For discussion of this period in inter-American relations and the
maintenance of hemispheric peace see A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, THE ORGANI-
ZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 316 (1963).
36. rd. at 318.
37. PAU, Final Act, Seventh Meeting of Consultation Of Ministers. of
Foreign Affairs, OEA/Ser.C/II. 7 (1960).
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convene a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in accordance
with article 6 of the Rio Treaty. In explaining the Mexican "nay"
the Mexican representative said that the proposal to call the
meeting lacked proper juridical basis because it dealt only with
possible threats to the peace and not with present threats.
Therefore it was stated that the council had no legal right under
the Rio Treaty to call a meeting.3 8
This position seems to be erroneous. Although the wording
of the Council in calling the meeting was directed to the poten-
tial threats to the peace that might arise from the intervention
of an extra-continental power, article 6 of the Rio Treaty can
still be considered applicable. This article speaks not only in
terms of aggression or actual threats to the peace but also speaks
of "any fact or situation that might endanger the peace." There-
fore it would cover present and actual threats to hemispheric
peace as well as possible and potential situations that might
threaten the peace.
Disunity continued to prevail at the Meeting of Consultation
of Foreign Ministers which was convened at Punta del Este,
Uruguay on January 22, 1962.89 Strong opposition manifested
itself to any collective severance of diplomatic and trade rela-
tions with Cuba-measures permitted by the terms of article 8
of the Rio Treaty, although the meeting had before it a report
of the Inter-American Peace Committee which pointed out that
the subversive activities of the Sino-Soviet bloc and the Cuban
Government in the Americas constituted "acts of 'political ag-
gression' or 'aggression of a non-military character'." The report
went on to say:
"Such acts represent attacks upon inter-American peace and
security as well as on the sovereignty and political inde-
pendence of the American states and therefore a serious
violation of fundamental principles of the inter-American
system .... "40
The meeting was able to adopt a declaration which stated
38. N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, Nov. 15, Dec. 5, Dec. 23, 1961. See also II PAU
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance Applications 1960-1964, at
67-68 (1964).
89. For the resolutions of the Eighth Meeting see id. at 69-80.
40. Final Considerations of the Report of the Inter-American Peace
Committee to the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs 1962, OEA/Ser. L/III/CIP/1/62, at 47.
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that the goals of international communism were incompatible
with the principles of the inter-American political system, such
as democracy, respect for and preservation of human rights,
non-intervention, and rejection of alliances and agreements that
may lead to non-American intervention. All of the members of
the OAS except Cuba voted for this declaration of incompati-
bility, but when collective action to counteract this incompati-
bility was discussed, foot dragging became evident.
A second resolution which called Cuba's Marxism-Leninism
incompatible with the principles and objectives of Pan-
Americanism, which declared that this incompetence excluded
Cuba from the OAS, and which called upon the Council of the
OAS and its commissions to adopt without delay the necessary
measures to carry out the resolution, was carried by a bare two-
thirds majority.41 The abstaining parties questioned the legality
of the exclusion on the ground that inter-American instruments
make no provision for the exclusion of a member. The stand of
the majority that incompatibility results in a member's auto-
matic exclusion or self-exclusion can be said to accord with a
traditional concept of international law which recognizes that
such law is conditioned upon a community of nations in agree-
ment with certain principles of behavior and fortified by agree-
ment upon some fundamental values and beliefs. Nations such as
Cuba, unwilling to accept the underlying ethical concepts on
which the law of the community is based, cannot be considered
members of the community and are dealt with on a political as
distinguished from a legal basis. Consequently, Cuba cannot
claim the rights and privileges pertaining to the inter-American
system, for the Castro regime is no longer willing to govern its
international conduct according to the community's basic rules
and principles.4
The only collective measure taken under the Rio Treaty at
Punta del Este was the resolution to suspend immediately trade
in arms and implements of war with Cuba.
41. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico abstained.
Cuba voted in the negative.
42. For discussion of the majority and minority views see A. THOMAS &
A. THOMAS, THE ORGANIZATION o AMERICAN STATES 59 (1963). See also Fen-
wick, The Issues at Punta del Este: Non-Intervention v. Collective Secur-
4ty, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 469 (1962). Dr. Fenwick would justify the exclusion
on the basis of the international law rule that violation of a treaty by one
party justifies the release from treaty obligations by the other party.
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In the months following the Punta del Este meeting events
in Cuba became even more ominous and Soviet domination of
the island even more clearly apparent as the Soviet Union moved
to bolster the military power on the island by an accelerated
build-up of Soviet military and technical personnel as well as
of arms and military equipment. United States spokesmen seemed
to be engaged in a little game of off-again-on-again as to the of-
fensive or defensive nature of the weapons. After much soul-
searching a decision was made that they were defensive and not
of a sufficient offensive power to constitute a threat to the other
parts of the hemisphere. President Kennedy did declare that if
Cuba sought to export its aggressive purposes by force or the
threat of force against any nation of the hemisphere and if Cuba
became an offensive military base of significant capacity for the
Soviet Union, then the United States would do whatever must
be done to protect its own security and that of its allies. 43 These
words seem to be some confirmation of the Monroe Doctrine but
they are one step removed. The Monroe Doctrine and the Caracas
Declaration would consider the domination or control of the
destiny of any American state by a non-American state or the
extension thereto of a non-American absolutist political system
in and of themselves as dangerous to the hemisphere and to the
peace and security of the United States. Such domination and
extension had already occurred in Cuba.
On October 22, 1962, the President of the United States made
public the evidence that the Soviet Union was converting Cuba
into a potentially offensive nuclear base against the United
States and the Western Hemisphere by the installation there of
ballistic missiles and jet bombers capable of carrying nuclear
warheads. 44 This urgent and secret military build-up in Cuba
was viewed as an explicit threat to the peace and security of the
Americas in violation of the Rio Treaty, the traditions of the
United States and the Western Hemisphere, and the Charter of
the United Nations. The President directed a strict naval quar-
antine of Cuba to halt the offensive build-up, called for a meet-
ing of the Organ of Consultation of the OAS to consider this
threat to the hemisphere in accordance with articles 6 and 8 of
the Rio Treaty, and requested a meeting of the United Nations
Security Council to take action against the threat to world peace.
43. 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 450, 481 (1962).
44. See an address of President Kennedy contained in 47 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 715 (1962).
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On the following day, in response to this initiative, the Coun-
cil of the OAS, acting as provisional Organ of Consultation in
accordance with article 12 of the Rio Treaty, found that Cuba,
despite repeated warning, had secretly endangered the peace of
the continent by permitting the Sino-Soviet powers to establish
intermediate and middle size missiles on its territory capable
of carrying nuclear warheads. The Provisional Organ resolved
in part:
"1. To call for the immediate dismantling of such offensive
weapons.
"2. To recommend that the member states in accordance
with Articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty take all mea-
sures individually and collectively, including the use
of armed force, which they deemed necessary to ensure
that the Government of Cuba did not continue to re-
ceive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and
related supplies which could threaten the peace and
security of the continent, and to prevent the missiles in
Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an
active threat to the peace and security of the conti-
nent."45 (Emphasis added.)
The vote on this resolution was 19 to 0 (Uruguay abstained
at the time for lack of instructions from its government, but
approval later came, hence the vote was unaminous). This crisis
produced the clearest show of unity since World War II, although
it was reported that Brazil, Mexico, and Bolivia had certain
reservations and abstained on the portion of the resolution which
authorized measures including the use of armed forces to pre-
vent the missiles from becoming a threat to continental peace
and security. They believed that such wording might be con-
strued to endorse an invasion of Cuba if the need arose to elimi-
nate such a threat.46 Again here is a manifestation of hesitancy
at an inward turning of the Monroe Doctrine. The rest of the
story-the quarantine, the confrontation of the Soviet bloc ships,
the Russion backdown, and agreement to remove the offensive
weapons, and the refusal of Castro to permit international in-
spection-is well known. Questions centering upon the legality
of the OAS actions are however noteworthy.
45. For the action of the OAS in the Cuban missile crisis 8ee II PAU,
Applications of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 1960-
1964, at 109 (1964).
46. N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, Oct. 28, 1962.
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. Although not explicitly stated and although the OAS acted
under article 6 of the Rio Treaty rather than article 3, it can be
contended that the OAS felt that it was confronted with a sit-
uation of self-defense, and that its reactions to the situation were
defensive. The theory that measures of self-defense, including
use of armed force, are not limited to actual armed attack only
and that they may be resorted to under article 3 of the Rio
Treaty against armed attack as well as under article 6 against
aggressions which are not armed attack is exemplified. The col-
lective action was not taken in the Cuban case against an actual
use of armed force but against the imminent and overwhelming
threat of armed attack. Secretary of State Rusk was of the opin-
ion that these offensive weapons located in Cuba had a signifi-
cance which was "immediate, and perhaps fateful to the mainte-
nance of the independence of the American nations. ' 47 There-
fore, the broader interpretation of article 51 of the United Na-
tions Charter would be said to have been accepted by the OAS
at least to the extent that measures of self-defense which can
partake of armed force are not limited to a reaction against il-
legal armed attack only, but are also permitted against an immi-
nent threat of illegal attack when the danger is clear and pres-
ent. Thus, if the quarantine action by naval forces was considered
an act of force in itself or as a threat of the use of force if a ves-
sel refused to obey, it can be considered legitimate as an exer-
cise of the right of collective self-defense. In any event it would
not seem to have been treated as an enforcement action which
under article 53 of the United Nations Charter would have re-
quired Security Council authorization. No Security Council
authorization was requested or intended by the OAS.
A State Department spokesman, although admitting that the
quarantine was defensive in character, denied that the action
was based on the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense. Rather it was called an action destined to maintain
hemispheric peace taken under the regional agency's co-
jurisdiction with the Security Council over efforts to preserve
peace. That the United Nations Charter recognizes a role appro-
priate for regional agencies in matters relating to international
peace is beyond cavil. The rub comes, however, when considera-
tion is given to the fact that article 53 of the United Nations
47. 47 DEP'T STATS BuLL. 720 (1962).
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Charter precludes the taking of enforcement measures by a
regional agency without Security Council authorization.
A case for the legality of this action as one of enforcement
or reprisal might have been made out at traditional international
law. But as a reprisal involving the use of force (if resort to
naval quarantine in and of itself can be considered force) or
the threat of the use of force (which was present if a ship re-
fused to honor the blockade), it would appear to be illegal as
individual or collective enforcement action without prior Securi-
ty Council authorization. Such use or threat of armed force
would then seem to be legitimate only if taken as a protective
measure in an exercise of the right of individual or collective
self-defense or if the OAS quarantine can be removed from the
stigma of enforcement action. It has been seen that the OAS has
always construed the meaning of enforcement action narrowly
and has not considered non-forceful measures not involving a
use of armed force as enforcement measures. But the naval quar-
antine did involve a use of armed force.
In any event, the American Republics when confronted with
an extra-continental intervention of excessive proportion endan-
gering their sovereignty sought refuge in solidarity and were
able to invoke the necessary collective measures to remove this
threat to their security. Although the doctrine was not men-
tioned, the American action can be considered an enforcement
of the Monroe Doctrine, and an enforcement along the lines of
the doctrine's original intention, i.e., against a non-American
intervention threatening the peace and security of the continent.
Also of note is the fact that this was collective action authorized
by the OAS rather than unilateral action to enforce the Monroe
Doctrine and the Rio Treaty. The doctrine in this instance had
become multilateral and continental.
Despite this solidarity against the non-American state by
an outward enforcement, the Monroe Doctrine continued to be
violated, for the Castro regime dominates Cuba and consequently
there remains in the hemisphere an extension of a non-American
political system, international communism, with its acts of sub-
version against neighboring American states. This was reempha-
sized on November 28, 1963, when the government of Venezuela
addressed a note to the Chairman of the Council of the OAS
requesting that the Organ of Consultation be convoked immedi-
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ately in accordance with article 6 of the Rio Treaty, "to consider
the measures that should be taken to deal with the acts of inter-
vention and aggression on the part of the Government of Cuba
that affect the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of Vene-
zuela as well as the operation of its democratic institutions.
48
The Council resolved to convoke the Organ of Consultation and
then acting as a Provisional Organ of Consultation authorized
the chairman to appoint a committee to investigate and report
on the acts complained of by Venezuela. The Committee when
formed visited Venezuela and in its report accused the govern-
ment of Cuba of acts of intervention and aggression in Venezuela.
These were said to fall within the following categories:
"a A hostile and systematic campaign of propaganda against
the Government of Venezuela, as well as incitement to
* and support of the Communist subversion that is being
carried out in that country;
"b. Training in all kinds of subversive activities, of numer-
ous Venezuelan citizens who traveled to Cuba for that
purpose;
"c. Remittance of funds through these travelers and other
channels, for the purpose of maintaining and increasing
subversive activities, and
"d. The provision of arms to guerrilla and terrorist groups
operating in Venezuela." 49
The committee concluded that Venezuela had been a target of
actions which were sponsored and directed by the government
of Cuba which were intended to subvert Venezuelan institutions
and overthrow that nation's democratic government through
terror, sabotage, assault and guerrilla warfare. This Cuban sup-
port of subversion was called political aggression.
Upon receiving the report of the investigating committee,
the Ninth Meeting of Consultation declared that the acts verified
48. Chayes, Law and the Quarantine of Cuba, 41 FoR.AFF. 550, 554 (1963).
For other discussions pro and con the legality of the action in the missile
crisis see Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 546 (1963);
Oliver, International Law and the Quarantine of Cuba, 57 AM. J. INT'L L.
373 (1963); Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and the Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 515
(1963); Fenwick, The Quarantine against Cuba: Legal or Illegal?, 57 AM.
J. IN'T L. 588 (1963); MacChesney, Some Comments on the "Quarantine" of
Cuba, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 592 (1963); McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine
and Self-Defense, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 597 (1963).
49. II PAU, Applications of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance 1960-1964, at 181, 201 (1964).
[VOL. 30
1970] ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 563
by the Committee constituted an aggression and intervention
on the part of the Government of Cuba in the internal affairs
of Venezuela, an aggression which affected all of the member
states. It emphatically condemned the Government of Cuba and,
in accordance with the provisions of articles 6 and 8 of the
Rio Treaty, called upon all members to sever diplomatic and
consular relations with Cuba, suspend all trade except in food-
stuffs, medicines, and medical equipment, and suspend all sea
transportation between them and Cuba with the exception of
that necessary for humanitarian reasons.
Cuba was also warned that if it should persist in carrying
out aggressive and subversive acts, the member states intended
to "preserve their essential rights as sovereign states by the use
of self-defense in either individual or collective form which
could go as far as resort to armed force, until such times as the
Organ of Consultation takes measures to guarantee the peace
and security of the hemisphere."50
The resolutions of this Meeting were not adopted by unan-
imous consent. Two nations doubted the legality of the actions
taken. The Government of Chile declared that the legality of
the use of the term "aggression" with reference to the actions
of Cuba against Venezuela was questionable, and it also refused
to agree to take the recommended action against Cuba because
the measures were not appropriate to the particular case. The
Government of Mexico declared that it was convinced that the
suggested measures were without foundation because the Rio
Treaty did not envisage the application of such measures in
situations of the kind and nature dealt with by the Meeting
of Consultation in this case. Mexico and Chile also disagreed
with the Meeting of Consultation's stand as to the right of self-
defense finding an exercise of the right in this type of aggression
and intervention to be incompatible with the right of self-defense
as recognized by article 3 of the Rio Treaty. These stands were
indicative of an acceptance of the narrow view of self-defense.
Although eventually the Government of Chile decided to follow
the lead of the majority of the members of the OAS and break
off relations with Cuba, Mexico has never done so.
It is difficult to understand the Chilean-Mexican stand which
would deny or question the actions of Cuba in this situation
50. Id. at 186.
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as being aggressions when stock is taken of the fact that both
countries agreed in the former Venezuelan-Dominican case that
certain acts of the Government of the Dominican Republic to
overthrow the Government of Venezuela could be classified as
aggression and intervention permitting collective measures of
the OAS.
In this earlier case the Dominican Republic's Trujillo regime
was indicted for complicity in an attempt on the life of the
President of Venezuela intended to bring about overthrow of
that nation's government. Persons implicated in the plot had
received moral and material support from officials of the Trujillo
regime, including the furnishing of travel facilities, arms and
instruction in their use to the conspirators, such arms to be
used in the coup against Venezuela's government. 51 If these
actions can be equated with aggression under the Rio Treaty
necessitating collective measures consisting of rupture of diplo-
matic relations and a partial interruption of economic measures,
measures to which Mexico and Chile approved, it would seem
that these countries could also have considered the more serious
and extended acts of subversion and terrorism carried on by
Cuba to be aggression also necessitating collective measures.
The OAS did not see fit to call for a collective use of armed
force in the Venezuelan-Cuban case, but instead called for resort
to lesser measures of a coercive nature to combat the imposi-
tion of extra-continental totalitarianism in the hemisphere and
the subversive intervention emanating therefrom. Thus, in the
actual case the broad right of self-defense was not in issue, for
the OAS has always insisted upon its right to use measures not
involving an employment of armed force without committing
violation of the United Nations Charter.
In April 1965 the OAS did see fit to call upon its members
for military action, for almost immediately following the land-
ing of United States forces in the Dominican Republic, the
Council of the OAS met to consider the serious situation in that
nation and the unilateral action of the United States with refer-
ence thereto. After calling upon the contending parties in the
prevailing situation of civil strife occurring in the Dominican
Republic to agree to a cease fire, the Council, at the request
of Chile, convened the Tenth Meeting of Foreign Ministers.
51. Id. at 3.
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Various measures by the Meeting were taken to reestablish
peace in the strife-torn Dominican Republic. The most contro-
versial was the request to members who were willing to do so
to make available to the OAS contingents of land, naval, air,
or police forces to form an Inter-American Peace Force to op-
erate under the authority of the Tenth Meeting. Following this
request, certain United States contingents were withdrawn and
the remainder were incorporated into the force under a unified
inter-American command. Some seven Latin American nations
participated, the largest contingent being that of Brazil.5 2 Here
then was a resort to collective armed force. Although a subject
of dispute, United States authorities viewed the threat of a
communist domination of the Dominican Republic as real and
imminent because of the increasing control of the rebel forces
in the Dominican Republic by a hard core of disciplined com-
munists trained in Cuba. Such a communist intervention and
infiltration of a rebellion would be considered as armed attack
against the territorial inviolability, the sovereignty and the
political independence of an American state, an intervention in
and an attempt to impose an extra-continental political system
in an American state, a situation involving a violation of the
Monroe Doctrine. Following the language of the Meeting of
Consultation in the Venezuelan-Cuban case, it would appear
clear that if the facts were such as to constitute acts of aggres-
sion and subversive intervention by Cuba against the Dominican
Republic, acts which resulted in armed rebellion in the latter
state, that the OAS could, under the Rio Treaty meet the armed
attack aided and fomented from abroad in an exercise of the
right of collective self-defense, even if necessary, by calling
for a collective resort to armed force through the formation of
an Inter-American Peace Force. This would be an exercise of
the right of self-defense against the armed attack through pre-
vention of control of the Dominican Republic by communism
emanating from Cuba. The Tenth Meeting of Consultation did
not see fit to proceed under the Rio Treaty. Instead it pro-
ceeded under articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of Bogoti to
consider matters of an urgent nature and common interest to
the American states, such matters being to consider the serious
situation created by armed strife in the Dominican Republic.
52. The official documents of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Min-
isters of Foreign Affairs are contained in I OAS Chronicle 19-41 (Aug. 1965).
See also id. at 1-9.
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No mention was made of armed attack, aggression, intra-
continental conflicts, or of threats to the peace of America.
These are the magic words which would have permitted invoca-
tion of the Rio Treaty and the imposition of its collective mea-
sures. Collective action by the Meeting of Consultation in the
form of armed force in a situation of civil strife in a member
state in which there was no aggression or subversive inter-
vention by another state could well be labelled illegal inter-
vention in the domestic jurisdiction of the state.
The resolution requesting governments to contribute armed
contingents for the peace force avoided any implication of col-
lective self-defense, or collective action against aggression or
a threat to hemispheric peace. Instead it concentrated on the
reestablishment of peace and democracy in the Dominican
Republic. It was said that since the OAS was charged with
interpreting the democratic will of its members and was
obligated to safeguard the principles of the Charter of the OAS,
that the organization was competent to assist its members in
the preservation of peace and the reestablishment of normal
democratic conditions by means of the Inter-American Peace
Force which had as its purpose cooperation in the restoration
of normal conditions in the Dominican Republic, the main-
tenance of the security of that country's inhabitants and the
inviolability of their human rights, and the establishment of an
atmosphere of peace and conciliation so that democratic institu-
tions could function. Although much lip service is paid to
democracy in the Charter of the OAS, it is doubtful that an
international norm binding each state to the democratic prin-
ciple has come into being. A legal duty on the part of each state
to protect and guarantee fundamental human rights might be
spelled out from the terms of the Charter, but still no power
is provided to the OAS to take any collective measures against
a state departing from democracy or violating human rights.58
Since the only coercive measures recognized as exceptions to
the principle of non-intervention are those taken in the right
of self-defense it can be maintained that an illegal collective
intervention had occurred. Arguments have been advanced that
the action was not interventionary in nature, but action taken
to render assistance to the people of a sister nation. Thus the
53. On democracy and human rights and the OAS, see A. THOMAS &
A. THOMAS, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES ch. XIV (1963).
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Inter-American Peace Force was called conciliatory in its func-
tion, its establishment being to foster peace and tranquility in
the Dominican Republic so its people could establish their own
domestic government to heal the wounds and bitterness of civil
strife and commence the nation's reconstruction.
The Costa Rican delegate expressed a view that would
recognize that the principle of non-intervention although of
import must give way in some instances to greater considera-
tions, i.e., the whole concept of inter-America and its principles.
He stated:
"Within the anarchy and the disorder which reign in the
Dominican Republic, no government can by itself maintain
order and guarantee the difficult democratic process. With-
out the collective juridical action of the OAS there will be
no more than two alternatives: either the permanency of
the United States troops, or the triumph of the extremists
and the establishment of a new communist dictatorship,
incompatible with the Inter-American System, and fountain
of subversive aggression against other governments of
America, especially of the Caribbean region."'5 4
A final problem of legality of the collective employment of
armed force has to do with the United Nations Charter. If
resort to armed force by member states and regional organiza-
tions can only be taken without Security Council authorization
in an exercise of the right of self-defense, then the establish-
ment and operations of the Peace Force would appear to be
beyond the powers of the OAS as it was not acting in self-
defense and as it had not obtained prior Security Council per-
mission. It will be remembered that the action of the OAS in
the Cuban missile crisis which involved armed force was inter-
preted by the State Department as not an enforcement action
but action for the maintenance of hemispheric peace under
co-jurisdiction in this sphere of the OAS with the Security
Council. Moreover the International Court of Justice has limited
the meaning of enforcement action by holding that the United
Nations operations in the Congo did not constitute enforcement
action for although an armed force was employed it was not
a use of armed force against a state, which had committed
aggression or breach of the peace; therefore no military action
54. Statement of the Special Delegate of Costa Rica, Acta de la Cuarta
Sesi6n de la Comision General, OEAJSer. F/11.10, doc. 32, 27 mayo 1965, at 13.
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against a state was authorized, and the operation did not involve
a preventive enforcement action against a state under Chapter
VII of the Charter which authorizes action as to threats and
breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. Employment of
this reasoning can be made to back up the legality of the OAS
action in the Dominican case for the Tenth Meeting was not
acting under the powers conferred upon it by the Rio Treaty.
It was therefore not taking preventive enforcement action against
a state guilty of aggression, a breach of the peace, or threatening
breach of the peace. It was acting in the case of a civil disorder.
As the United Nations Malaysian representative stated, the
Peace Force exercised a conciliatory function. As such it was
not an enforcement operation but a pacific settlement operation
requiring a minimum use of force to prepare the conditions
necessary to permit the free will of the Dominican people to
prevail.55
Although the attempted control of the Dominican Republic
by an extra-continental totalitarian system was a failure, the
threat of such extension to other hemispheric states did not
disappear. On June 5, 1967, at the behest of the Government
of Venezuela, a Meeting of Consultation, the Twelfth, was
once again convoked to consider a problem of an urgent nature
and of common interest to the Americas. The problem, according
to Venezuela, was the fostering and organizing by Cuba of
subversive and terrorist activities in the territory of various
states. These interventionary activities, which were violative
of the sovereignty and integrity of the American states, were
said to be taken by Cuba with the deliberate aim of destruction
of inter-American principles. The conclusions of the Twelfth
Meeting agreed that Cuba was giving moral and material sup-
55. CERTAIN EXPENSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 1962 I.C.J. REP. 151, 177.
On the remarks by the Malaysian representative, see G.A.O.R. 20th Sess.
Supp. No. 2(A/6002), at 116-17 (1965). There has been a voluminous literature
on the Dominican case and It has created much controversy. For a sampling,
see A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, THE DOMINICAN CRISIS 1965 (The Hammarskjold
Forums 1967); Naughton, The Dominican Crisis: An Examination of the
Traditional and Contemporary Concepts of International Law, 4 DUQUESNE
U.L.REv. 547 (1966); Nanda, The United States' Action in the 1965 Dominican
Crisis: Impact on World Order, 43 DENVER L.J. 439 (1966); DENVER L.J. 225
(1967); Fenwick, The Dominican Republic: Intervention or Collective Self-
Defense, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 64 (1966); Bohan, The Dominican Case: Uni-
lateral Intervention, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 809 (1966); Slater, The Limits of
Legitimization in International Organizations: The Organization of Ameri-
can States and the Dominican Crisis, 23 INT. OR(;. 48 (Winter 1969); R. BAR-
NET, INTERVENTION AND REVOLUTION 153-80 (1968); McLaren, Dominican Crisis:
An Inter-American Dilemma, 4 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 178 (1966).
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port to the Venezuelan guerrilla and terrorist movement and
pointed to evidence received from Bolivia of Cuban interven-
tion in that country's territory through the preparing, financing,
and organizing of guerrilla activities there. It was also noted
that the First Afro-Asia-Latin American People's Solidarity
Conference which had taken place in Havana in 1966, was
conducive of further efforts of communism and other forces to
aid and abet guerrilla terrorist and other subversive activities
under Cuban control and direction against American govern-
ments. The Meeting then adopted a weak resolution which,
among other things, condemned Cuba for its acts of aggression
and intervention against Venezuela, Bolivia, and other states,
requested members of the OAS to restrict their trade and finan-
cial relations with Cuba until the aggressive and interventionary
policy of Cuba ceased, requested governments supporting the
Afro-Asia-Latin America People's Solidarity program to with-
draw their support from this organization, and finally called
upon members of the OAS to bring to the United Nations' atten-
tion the acts of Cuba which were violative of the United Nations'
non-intervention principle.56
Despite the condemnation and denunciation of Cuba's acts
of aggression and intervention and despite the earlier OAS
collective measures of a diplomatic and economic nature directed
against Cuba, the interventionary actions of international com-
munism have continued although apparently in somewhat modi-
fied form. In 1967 the Special Consultative Committee on Security
of the OAS in a report on the Cuban communist regime's newly
formed Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO), whose
purpose was to direct, support, and encourage hemispheric sub-
version from Havana by guerrilla warfare in rural and urban
areas, pinpointed occurrences of LASO-encouraged and directed
guerrilla actions in Guatemala, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Brazil, and
Bolivia. Agitation among Uruguayan workers and development
of activities to promote subversion in Ecuador and Peru were
also noted as emanating from organizations supported and
encouraged by Cuba. Attention was directed to the fact that
international communism, and particularly Castroism, had infil-
trated both the racial and the peace demonstration movements
in the United States.5
7
56. The documents of the Twelfth Meeting are contained in III OAS
CHRONICLE 14 (Oct. 1967); see also on the Meeting id. at 1-2 (Aug. 1967).
57. See PAU, Special Consultative Committee on Security Against the
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Undoubtedly the death of Ch6 Guevara and his band of
Cuban guerrilla leaders at the hands of the Bolivian Army was
a serious blow to Castroism. Latin American radicals who think
in terms of violent revolution no longer look to the Cuban
experience as a perfect guide. They have replaced Castroism
with a more violent communist revolutionary ideology derived
from merging the cult of Ch6 Guevara with the cult of Mao
Tse-Tung. This is being translated into violent hit-and-run
revolutionary activities conducted by militarily autonomous
guerrilla groups. Nevertheless these groups still look to Cuba
and Red China for financial assistance, and Cuba remains the
headquarters for the indoctrination of American revolutionaries
in subversive techniques and in the use of advanced and sophis-
ticated weapons of war.55
UNILATERAL AcTION
Not only has there been collective action through the OAS
to combat the intervention and extension of extra-continental
international communism to the hemisphere, but there has also
been unilateral action by the United States, and to a lesser extent
by certain Latin American states,59 against such intrusion. This
would appear to be continued unilateral enforcement of the
Monroe Doctrine in the face of the modern notion or contention
to the effect that the doctrine has become through the Rio Treaty
a multilateral or continental doctrine to be enforced only through
collective action of the American states. Nevertheless there are
enunciations expressive of a contrary view to the effect that
the Monroe Doctrine has not been committed exclusively to
Subversive Action of International Communism, The First Conference of the
Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO), Study prepared by the
SCCS at its Ninth Regular Meeting 1967, OEA/Ser.L/X/11.18; PAU, Spe-
cial Consultative Committee on Security Against the Subversive Action of
International Communism, Cultural Congress of Havana, Study prepared by
the SCCS at its Tenth Regular Meeting 1968, OAS/Ser.L/X/11.19; PAU,
Report of the Special Consultative Committee on Security on the Work
Done During its Eighth Regular Meeting, May 15 to June 9, 1967, OAS/Ser.-
L/X/1l.16.
58. See, e.g., LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN-A HANDBOOK 463-64 (C.
Veliz, ed., 1968); M. NEEDLER, POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF LATIN AMEIRCA 227 (2d ed.
1970). See also statements by Governor Rockefeller and Secretary General
Galo Plaza in the N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1969. The New York Times has also
reported the refusal of the United States to grant visas to certain Cuban
United Nations representatives because of aid both financial and directoral
given to militant black groups in the United States. N.Y. Times, April 5, 1969.
59. For example, Nicaragua and Honduras gave certain aid in the Guate-
malan case, and Nicaraguan and Guatemalan territory was reportedly used
for training and as a springboard for the Bay of Pigs invasion.
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group decision and action. President Eisenhower declared that
the "Monroe Doctrine has by no means been supplanted." 0
Secretary of State Dulles called the Soviet intervention in the
hemisphere a "challenge to our Monroe Doctrine" and a funda-
ment of "our foreign policy.""' President Kennedy began his
term of office stressing the multilateral aspects by informing
that the United States would join with its fellow American
states to oppose aggression or subversion in the Americas.02
But after the ill-starred Cuban invasion, while disclaiming uni-
lateral intervention in Cuba unless the United States were sub-
jected to attack, he went on to say that United States restraint
was not inexhaustible and
"[s]hould it ever appear that the inter-American doctrine
of non-interference merely conceals or excuses a policy of
non-action, if the nations of the Hemisphere should fail to
meet their commitment against outside Communist penetra-
tion, then I want it clearly understood that this Govern-
ment will not hesitate in meeting its pressing obligations,
which are the security of our nation."68
President Johnson seemed to bear out the language of
President Kennedy when he intervened unilaterally in the
Dominican Republic and stated that "we don't propose to sit
here in our rocking chair with our hands folded and let the
communists set up any government in the Western Hemi-
sphere."6 4
The language of these officials would tend to indicate that
the Monroe Doctrine is still unilateral policy of the United States
applicable to prevent the imposition of a non-American totali-
tarianism in the Americas, at least in instances when the
American nations cannot or will not act collectively to meet
their commitments. From a legal point of view, however, the
question arises as to whether such a unilateral policy can under
the obligations assumed by the United States be exercised uni-
laterally, for unilateral action would seem to be more extensively
curtailed than regional or collective action of the OAS under
60. PuBLIc PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THI UNITED STATES, DWIGHT D.
EISENHOWER 1960-61, at 651 (1961). 5
61. Dulles, International Communism in Guatemala, 81 DEP'T STATE BULL.
43 (1954).
62. 44 DEP'T STATE BULL. 175 (1961).
63. Id. at 659.
64. As quoted by J. MARTIN, OVERTAKEN By EVENTS 738 (1966).
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the Charter of Bogota or the Rio Treaty. Unilateral action of a
coercive nature even if taken as reprisals against delictual
conduct to vindicate the law or to obtain redress or reparation
or a return to legality are outlawed by the non-intervention
principle, for no exception to such intervention has been made
under the Charter of BogotA which prohibits direct or indirect
intervention in the internal or external affairs of a state for any
reason whatever."5 Therefore unilateral interventionary or coer-
cive measures involving the use of armed force as well as those
of an economic or political character are forbidden by the
principle.
The right of individual and collective self-defense is however
specifically excepted from the operation of the non-intervention
mandate.0 Therefore under the Charter, the unilateral action
taken by an American state against another American state to
prevent or remove a non-American totalitarianism, whether such
action involved a use of armed force or otherwise, would appear
to be illegal unless the action can be brought within the meaning
of individual or collective self-defense as permitted by the
Charter of the United Nations and the Rio Treaty.
The United States termination of the Cuban sugar quota
and her severance of diplomatic relations with Cuba appear to
be acts not strictly interventionary in nature, i.e., were not acts
taken to impose the United States will on Cuba or to coerce
Cuba. The stated reason for the sugar quota cut was to assure
ample sugar supply for the United States in the light of the
increasing amounts of sugar which Cuba was committing to
the communist bloc. 67 Moreover, Cuban officials had complained
of that quota and had said that its termination would be more
beneficial to Cuba for it enslaved the Cuban people.68
The embargo placed on Cuba by the United States could
well be considered as a reprisal and therefore illegal as economic
intervention. However, the language used by the Government
of the United States speaks in terms of defense of the legitimate
65. Charter of the OAS arts. 15 and 16. See also A. THOMAS & A.
THOMAS, NoN-INTERVENTION: TH9 LAW AND ITS IMPORT IN THE AMERICAS 138
(1950).
66. Charter of the OAS art. 18.
67. Press Release, President Reduces Cuban Sugar Quota for Balance
of 1960, 48 DEP'T STATE BULL. 140 (1960).
68. See text of a U.S. Aide Memoire delivered on June 4, 1960, to the
Foreign Ministry of Cuba, 42 DEP'T STATE BULL. 994 (1960).
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economic interests of the people of the United States against
Castro's discriminatory, aggressive, and injurious economic
policies.0 9
This would indicate an exercise of the right of individual
self-defense against illegal Cuban actions directed against the
United States, and if self-defense is permitted under the United
Nations Charter in a proportionate manner against delicts which
seriously and imminently endanger the essential interests of
a state, and if there is absence of other lawful means of protec-
tion, then the embargo could be characterized as an act of self-
defense or protection.
The armed invasion in 1954 of Guatemala by Guatemalan
rebels bent on overthrow of the Arbenz Government and the
armed invasion of Cuba in 1961 by Cuban rebels bent on over-
throw of the Castro Government present more serious prob-
lems. In aiding and abetting these rebel groups by supplying
them with arms, and, in the case of the Cuban rebels by sup-
plying them with transport and training, the United States
was guilty of acts which in previous cases before the OAS had
been held violative of the Civil Strife Convention, the non-
intervention principle, and had been equated to aggression. 70
In the case of Cuba the United States action which would be
otherwise considered an illegal aggression by proxy or indirect
aggression might be justified as an exercise of the right of self-
defense against a whole series of illegal acts endangering the
essential interests of the United States in a situation where
there was no other recourse. These illegal acts consisted of the
waging of a campaign of hostile propaganda against the United
States, attacks on United States naval vessels, a discriminatory
economic policy against United States citizens, and confiscation
and intervention of properties of such citizens. 71
The United States aid to the Guatemalan rebels in the
69. For reasons for the embargo see Press Release, United States Insti-
tutes Control on Exports to Cuba, 43 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 715 (1960).
70. See statements by the Council of the OAS and the Secretary General
of the OAS as set forth respectively in Applications of the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance 1948-1956, at 126 (1957); 3 ANNALS OF OAS,
10-11 (1951). It has been noted, e.g., that the Guatemalan and Bay of Pigs
invasions were violations of inter-American norms by the United States and
that the OAS failed to protect these countries from these aggressions.
J. SLATER, THE OAS AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 109 (1967).
71. For these actions of the Cuban government, see A. THOMAS & A.
THOMAS, THE ORGANIZATION or AMERICAN STATES 318 (1963).
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overthrow of the communist-infiltrated government of that coun-
try is more difficult to vindicate. The only breach of inter-
national law which appeared to have existed was the takeover
of certain properties of United States citizens without, accord-
ing to United States authority, prompt, adequate, and just com-
pensation.7 2 Arming a rebel band to overthrow the expropriating
or confiscating government would hardly seem proportionate
to the offense. In other international cases of disputes over
expropriations, the United States had refrained from such
action.73 However, if one applies the Caracas declaration and
concludes that Guatemala was in violation of an inter-American
norm by permitting the imposition of an extra-continental
totalitarianism and that such violation would endanger the
security of each and all of the American Republic so as to permit
unilateral as well as collective action in self-defense, then the
action of the United States could be considered as legal.
The case of the unilateral intervention in the Dominican
Republic presents a little different picture. Here the action was
turned against an American state not to remove a communist
dominated or infiltrated government, but to prevent the imposi-
tion of such a government. The United States military presence
was said among other things to be necessary "in view of the
clear and present danger of the forcible seizure of power by
the Communists. 7 4 Voices have been raised claiming that the
possibility of a communist take-over was an exaggeration by
the United States.75 Nevertheless, United States authorities
viewed the threat as real and imminent because of increasing
control of the rebel forces by a hard core of disciplined com-
munists trained in Cuba. Thus Adolf Berle has remarked that
the revolt in the Dominican Republic "liberated a force organized
by three communists groups-Communists claiming support from
Fidel Castro in Cuba, Communists claiming to follow Moscow,
72. On the dispute between the United States and Guatemala over the
takeover of United Fruit Company properties, see A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS,
NON-INTERVENTION: THE LAW AND ITS IMPORT IN THE AMERICAS 348 (1956).
73. See, e.g., the Mexican expropriations and the United States reaction,
id. at 50-51.
74. Address by Thomas C. Mann, Under Secretary of State for Economic
Affairs, Dep't State Press Release 241, Oct. 12, 1965, at 8. See also statement
by President Johnson May 2, 1965, 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 744 (1965); address
by President Johnson, id. at 989; statement of Secretary of State Rusk, DEP'T
STATE PUS. 7971, Inter-American Series 92 (1965.)
75. See Comments on the Dominican Republic by Senator Fulbright, 89
CoNo. REC. 198 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1965); Draper, The Dominican Crisis: A
case Study in American Policy, 1965 COMMENTARY 33 (Dec. 1965).
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and Communists claiming to follow the Peking line." He went
on to say:
"Indications suggested that the Moscow-Castro Communists
had entered the fray; the situation was made to order for
such a move. Given the nearby presence of the Russian-
oriented communist government of Cuba, with a contingent
of Soviet soldiers, Russian weapons, and 250,000 Cubans
under arms, and Fidel Castro's stated intention and capacity
to move, there was little chance that the power vacuum
would long remain unfilled.'" 6
Internal revolutions which result in the use of force for
the overthrow of a government in a nation normally could not
be considered as "armed attack" or "aggression" for purposes
of the United Nations Charter or the Rio Treaty. Nevertheless
action in abetting, fomenting, and aiding subversive or revolu-
tionary movements in another state is a violation of international
law and has been labelled as aggression, or to some, indirect
aggression."1 When armed rebellion breaks out in a country as
a result of foreign subversive activities it can be considered that
an armed attack has occurred for the force necessary for armed
attack includes not only a direct use of force by regular military
units from a foreign state, but also an indirect use of force
whereby a state operates through irregular groups or rebels
of the victim state.78 In such an instance the victim may exercise
its right of self-defense against the aggressor state and of course
may act against the subversive groups within the country. In
76. A. BERLE, POWE 44 (1969). Mr. Berle remarked at the time of the
Dominican crisis: the situation in such a case is no longer an indigenous
revolutionary movement, but an "overseas attack" on an American republic.
Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 1, 1965, at 13. Ambassador John Bartlow
Martin states emphatically that "there was a real danger of a Communist
takeover of the Dominican Republic." He further states that President
Johnson under the circumstances had no choice but to send troops. J. MAR-
TIN, OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS 705 (1966).
77. See Habana Convention on the Duties and Rights of States in the
Event of Civil Strife, PAU, Treaties and Conventions signed at the Sixth
International Conference of American States, Habana, Cuba, Jan. 16-Feb. 20,
1928, at 19-20 (1950). see also A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, THE ORGANIZATION OF
AMERICAN STATES 345 (1963) for short discussion of OAS cases involving
fomenting of civil strife as aggression. Bee also Request of the Government
of Venezuela, II PAU Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance Appli-
cations 1960-1964, at 181 (1964).
78. II PAU Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance Applications
1960-1964, at 185 (1964); M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
Pusuc ORDER 190 (1961).
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the Dominican case if it is accepted that there was an armed
attack aided and abetted from Cuba or other foreign communist
movements, and if it is accepted that there was a clear and
present danger of a seizure of power in the Dominican Republic
by those forces under foreign control, a forceful intervention
by the United States or other American republics to stop the
armed aggression and prevent it from bearing fruit could be
said to come within the terms of article 3 of the Rio Treaty
which provides that an armed attack against an American state
is an attack against all of the American states. Each nation is
thereby obligated to take certain measures to assist the victim
upon the latter's request in the exercise of the inherent right of
individual and collective self-defense until the organ of con-
sultation of the OAS can meet to determine the collective mea-
sures necessary to be taken.
The difficulty in the Dominican case centers around the
problem of who had the capacity to speak for the state and
request aid. The de jure government of the state would normally
be the entity requesting aid, but that government had collapsed
the second day of the revolution. The rebel forces had no iden-
tifiable leadership until some six days after the commencement
of the revolt. Loyalists, those opposing the rebels, did quickly
form a military junta to govern and it was this junta which,
after admitting a situation of anarchy, requested United States
armed intervention.7 9
It is problematic, however, whether either faction would
speak for the Dominican Republic; hence contention can be
made that the request of the victim state provision of article 3
was not properly met. On the other hand the drafters of article
3 probably never contemplated a situation of anarchy when
constituted governmental authority would disappear. It could
well be thought, therefore, that a request from the military
junta, which, in the words of the late Ambassador Stevenson,
was the "only apparent responsible authority left in the coun-
try,"80 would be sufficient. A further difficulty is met. The junta
did request a United States military force to restore law and
79. For an historical sketch of this initial period of the revolution, see
Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, Background Informa-
tion Relating to the Dominican Republic, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); D.
KURZMAN, SANTO DOMINGO: REVOLT OF THE DAMNED 40 (1965).
80. S/PV.1200 (5 May 1965), at 11.
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order and save lives, but it did not request additional troops
to avert communist aggression.81
The question therefore arises as to whether a request for
aid by the victim state is always necessary. For example, if
anarchy prevents a state from countering an attack against it
and from requesting aid from its fellow states, would its fellow
state be precluded from exercising a right of collective self-
defense to aid the victim? If collective self-defense means that
two or more nations can take collective action in the right of
self-defense when each state has an individual right of self-
defense, then a request from the state actually attacked would
not appear necessary. A fellow state might then act in self-
defense if it can show some legal interest of its own being
invaded. It has been recognized that a state may act in self-
defense to assist another state to repel aggression when a close
relationship exists between the two states based on solidarity,
for the legal interests of both states would be violated by an
armed attack against either of them.82 If the security of a group
of states, such as those who are members of the OAS, is
dependent in fact upon the security of each and every one of
them, a violation of the rights of any members of the group
would be a violation of all permitting joint efforts for protec-
tion. The OAS is founded on the close integration of its mem-
bers. It recognizes the right of collective self-defense and
declares that an attack against one American state is an attack
against all. Thus each state of the Americas has a legal right
in the security of all other states: an aggression against one is
an aggression against all. s The indirect armed attack or aggres-
sion against the Dominican Republic was therefore also an
aggression against each nation of the hemisphere, including the
United States. The latter thereby suffered a violation of its
own legal rights and could exercise the right of self-defense
to protect not only against injury to itself but also against injury
to the Dominican Republic even in the absence of a request from
that nation.
81. See Statement by President Johnson, April 28th, 1965, 52 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 738 (1965). Friedman, United States Policy and the Crisis of Interna-
tional Law, 59 AM. J. INTL. L. 857, 868 (1965), sets out the view that there
was an absence of request from a government in the Dominican case and
that the United States intervention therefore could not be Justified.
82. Bowett advances such a proposition. See BowETT ch. X.
83. Art. 24, Charter of OAS; art. 3, Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance.
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CONCLUSION
There still remains ample legal scope for a collective as well
as a unilateral application and enforcement under the inter-
national law of the United Nations Charter, the Charter of
Bogota, and the Rio Treaty. Issue may and has been taken with
the broad theory of the right of self-defense by those who inter-
pret the right narrowly to meet an actual armed attack. Never-
theless, respectable authority supports the broader view. More-
over, the existence of any special relationship or solidarity of
the nations of the Western Hemisphere has been questioned in
recent times as has the fact that the security of the American
states rests upon the security of each so that an aggression
against one becomes an aggression against all. In particular
it is often emphasized that the security of the United States
is not necessarily bound up or connected with that of Latin
America.8 4 Such thinking strikes at the heart of the inter-
American system and its system of collective security against
extra-continental and intra-continental aggression. It also strikes
against the Monroe Doctrine, for the principal basis of that
doctrine has been the fear that extra-continental interventions
in the hemisphere and the imposition of extra-continental
totalitarian regimes would create security problems for the
United States. If this negative line of reasoning should prevail
the whole legal underpinning for unilateral and collective action
for the defense of the Americas will disappear, since the prin-
ciple of self-defense means that action can be taken against
serious delicts of other states endangering the essential interests
or security of another state, here an American state or states.
Again there are those who, in accepting either the narrow
or broad view of the principle of self-defense to protect a nation's
security, still question the facts in the cases which have arisen
in such a manner as to destroy the legal grounds for action.
In the Cuban missile crisis argument is advanced that the loca-
84. See, e.g., D. PERKINS, A HISTORY OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE 389 (Rev. ed.
1955), who belittles the danger of international communism in the hemis-
phere. See also D. PERKINS, THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA (1961).
Senator Fulbright has stated the belief that the Castro regime is of little
importance to the security of the United States. He has said "The Castro
regime is a thorn in the flesh; but it is not a dagger in the heart." Quoted
by A. SCHLESINGER, JR., A THOUSAND DAYS 251 (1965). But see J. DREIER, THE
ORGANIZATION O THE AMERICAN STATES AND THE HEMISPHERE CRISIS 6 (1962)
and a summing up of the importance of Latin America in R. BURR, OUR
TROUBLED HEMISPHERE ch. II (1967).
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tion of the missiles in Cuba did not constitute the requisite
imminent threat.85 In the Dominican Republic case disbelief was
expressed with the view of the Government of the United
States and others to the effect that the facts were such as to
show an imminent communist peril because of the increasing
control of rebel forces by communists trained in Cuba.8 As a
result, to these questioners the United States military action
becomes an illegal intervention in a situation of civil strife, not
a reaction against an indirect armed attack on an American
Republic.
Resort to individual or collective action to remove or attempt
to remove a communist-infiltrated government in the Americas
is often condemned because the fact of such infiltration is in
issue. In addition there exists a strong trend of thought which
minimizes or dismisses the danger of a communist government
in an American state because of the disintegration of monolothic
Moscow-controlled communism. This diversity in communist
ranks, so it is stated, is a counteractant to and minimizes the
dangers of communism's aggressive qualitiess 7 Finally there
are those who differentiate between fascist and communist
totalitarianism. They would apparently support actions against
aggressive fascist intervention but not against aggressive com-
munist intervention because they see in communism, at least
since the ending of the Stalin era, a liberalizing trend. Com-
munism is not therefore regarded with the same degree of
apprehension as fascism.88
Contention can and has been taken with all of these premises
and positions and some of the ideas appear tenuous at best.
To find much liberalization in the human rights field in the
communist world demands something of a creative imagination.
A minimization of the aggressive qualities of communism hardly
seems warranted, even though there might be a split in the
communist bloc. Despite that split, subversion and indirect
aggression have continued in the Western Hemisphere with
85. Wright, 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 549 (1962), sets forth the belief that the
stationing of the missiles in Cuba did not even constitute an illegal threat
of force much less an imminent threat.
86. See authorities cited in note 75 supra.
87. See, e.g., SLATER, THE OAS AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 108
(1967); Morgenthau, To Intervene or Not To Intervene, 45 FOR.AFF. 425, 432
(1967).
88. Friedmann, Interventionism, Liberalism and Power-Politics: The Un-
finished Revolution in International Thinking, 83 POL. Sci. Q. 169, 178-85 (1968).
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Cuba (which is still in league with the Soviet Union and yet
retains its sympathy with Maoism) as the prime source. To
downgrade the threat to the security of the hemisphere and of
the United States from communism's aggressions is foolhardy.
It can hardly be gainsaid that additional Cubas in the continent
would be destructive of continental security and a most serious
threat to the security of the United States.
The unilateral and multilateral Monroe Doctrine would then
seem to remain of import in the modern world in order to con-
tribute to the security of the American States, but its applica-
tion appears to be limited and its effectiveness, or at least its
effective application, questioned. After all that has been said and
done since the rise of Castro and his association with Marxism-
Leninism, the communist regime in Cuba has not been sup-
planted. A violation of the Monroe Doctrine continues. The mul-
tilateral doctrine was applied with success on the occasion of
the Cuban missile crisis when it was directed outwardly against
an extra-continental power. At this time the American republics
were shocked into a state of unity and were able to invoke
collective measures to remove this threat of hemispheric chal-
lenge. They faced the challenge and met it. But the OAS has
not found such unity when it was confronted with a situation
which would demand an inward turning of the doctrine against
an American state which had become dominated by extra-
continental totalitarianism. Collective measures were finally
directed against Cuba because of her subversive activities against
Venezuela but these measures of an economic and diplomatic
nature were too little and came too late either to topple the
regime in Cuba or to prevent the continuing aggressions emanat-
ing therefrom. Collective action turned inward against an Amer-
ican state to prevent a communist take-over has also been met
with Latin American resistance. Measures were authorized in the
Dominican case, but most reluctantly and with dissension.
It is ironic to note that in these cases the action, unilateral
and multilateral, appears to be taken in many instances against
the wrong state. To relieve an American nation which has come
to be dominated by an extra-continental totalitarianism through
subversive intervention, the action should be within the classic
meaning of the Monroe Doctrine directed against the non-
American intruder or aggressor, say the Soviet Union. In a case
like the Dominican case where action is taken in the country to
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prevent a rebel group controlled by Cuba from acquiring power,
it would seem that the troublemaker is Cuba and action should
be taken against her. Practical reasons might militate against
such measures however. Measures taken against the Soviet
Union would either be so limited as to be ineffective to remove
the intrusion, or they would result in a nuclear war. An out-
right invasion of Cuba would appear to be the only means of
ridding the island of communism but with the Soviet Union's
backing of the Castro regime, this, too, would run the risk of
nuclear war.
Consideration of the unilateral action of the United States
in these cases leads to the conclusion that as United States policy
the Monroe Doctrine remains alive, at least in instances when
the OAS will not or cannot mutually protect continental security.
But it remains to be seen whether or not the United States will
in the future, should the occasion arise, act to prevent a sub-
versive take over in other American states. The strong criticism
at home and abroad directed at its efforts in the Dominican
Republic coupled with its Vietnam experience might well make
the country chary of further involvements. On the other hand
even in our most isolationist period, a special relationship with
Latin America has existed, enforced by a pervasive belief that
the security of the hemisphere is bound up with our security.
